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I. Introduction
In the past decade, there has been a growing awareness of the
alarming safety issues surrounding nuclear power facilities in
former Communist countries. As political regimes collapsed
throughout Central and Eastern Europe during the late 1980s, their
nuclear energy legacy remained. Issues surrounding this legacy
continue to influence nuclear development.1 The prevailing notion
is that continued operation of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors in
former Communist States poses an unacceptable safety risk to
Western Europe and to the world.2
In 1992, governments of the world's major economic powers
initiated a program to address the most urgent of these perceived
problems, providing training, administrative development, and
technical measures for Eastern European nuclear programs.
3
Germany in particular engaged in a joint project with the Russian
Federation establishing a measurement and information system to
monitor environmental radioactivity near Russian nuclear stations.4
Other international responses included the negotiation of a
Convention on Nuclear Safety and plans for a Nuclear Waste
Convention to be negotiated in the near future.5 While these
1. Commission Document on the Nuclear Industries in the European Union
(An Illustrative Nuclear Programme According to Article 40 of the Euratom
Treaty), 1997 O.J. (C 206) 8.
2. In a report to a special session of the United Nations General Assembly
in 1997, the German Government expressed this concern, calling for immediate
action through up-grading or decommissioning existing facilities. Towards
Sustainable Development in Germany: Report of the Federal Republic of Germany
on the Occasion of the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on
Environment and Development in 1997 in New York (visited Nov. 9, 1997)
<http://195.80.205.111/UNBericht/etitel.htm>.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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responses indicate an international concern for the problems
surrounding Central and Eastern European nuclear programs, they
are merely a preliminary step in taking necessary action.
Regardless of the inherent dangers involved, the democratic
republics which emerged from behind the Iron Curtain have been
faced with financial difficulties and electricity shortages which
prevent them from discontinuing operation of Soviet-designed
reactors. 6 Even so, many of these facilities will begin to reach the
end of their useful lives within the next ten to fifteen years.7 It is
therefore inevitable that Central and Eastern European countries
will need to contend with the challenges and safety issues associ-
ated with decommissioning antiquated nuclear plants.8 It is also
likely that these same countries will face the decision of whether to
commission new nuclear facilities. As the catastrophic incident at
Chernobyl demonstrated in 1986, a single major accident can result
in fallout being released across international borders, leading to
major health and environmental concerns for many countries.9 It
follows that the international community, and particularly those
countries located in regions adjacent to Central and Eastern
Europe, have a tremendous interest in assuring that their neighbors
maintain a safe nuclear energy establishment. Where a country
lacks the requisite resources to maintain such an establishment, that
country must be able to rely on the support of other countries.1 °
Furthermore, the recipient of this support must be willing to abide
by international agreements and standards."
6. Nathalie Horbach & Erik Hanenburg, Legal Aspects of the Decommis-
sioning of Nuclear Facilities: A Comparative View, 58 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 29, 29-30
(1996).
7. Id at 29. This trend is not limited to facilities in Central and Eastern
Europe. Nuclear facilities around the world will face, the end of their useful lives,
and the number of plants being decommissioned will peak around the year 2015.
Id.
8. Id.
9. W. Schwarzer, The Role of Nuclear Safety Standards, Procedures for
Development and Possibilities for International Harmonization, in 6 UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE FOR THE PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY TECHNICAL REPORTS 1, 11 (1987).
10. Technical Criteria for a Nuclear Power Program, in 2 UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE FOR THE PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE
PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY TECHNICAL REPORTS 119, 120 (1987).
This is particularly true in the "sensitive" areas of operation such as reliability and
safety. Id.
11. This is most crucial in the areas of incident notification, safeguards for
fissile materials, mutual assistance, and safety inspections. Id.
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Unfortunately, even when a country is willing to embrace this
obligation, there remains the ambiguous task of ascertaining which
standards and agreements must be followed. A number of
international bodies have developed standards pursuant to nuclear
energy and have developed close interorganizational relationships
in creating these standards.12 Even these convoluted standards
and interrelationships are binding only to varying degrees.13
While it has been suggested that national legal frameworks should
follow the guidelines of international bodies, 4 and while there
seems to be a consensus that European Union (EU) nuclear
strategy should be developed along with international bodies,15
only the standards of the European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom) are mandatory within the EU.16 Standards issued by
bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
and the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are merely
directory recommendations. 7 In particular, considerable efforts by
the IAEA to harmonize nuclear regulations among the various
countries have been plagued by the dilemma that the organization's
standards can only be implemented in conjunction with national
safety regulations. 8 And while it has been further suggested that
such international standards should be binding, 9 it has also been
noted that some components of these standards may be redundant
in their application to the existing law of some countries. 20 As is
the case with other international bodies, the international commun-
12. In particular, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has recog-
nized interactions between the IAEA, Euratom, and the Nuclear Energy Agency
(NEA) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD). Mohamed Elbaradei et al., International Law and Nuclear Energy:
Overview of the Legal Framework (visited Nov. 12, 1997) <http:/www.iaea.or.at-
/worldatom/inforesource/bulletin/bul1373/rames.html> (expressing their organi-
zation's role in the formation of international nuclear policy).
13. Id.
14. Horbach & Hanenburg, supra note 6, at 46.
15. Nuclear Industries in the European Union, supra note 1.
16. Elbaradei, supra note 12.
17. Id. While not initially binding, IAEA standards may become binding in
cases where the agency's assistance is sought. Id.
18. Schwarzer, supra note 9, at 11.
19. Id.
20. For example, the IAEA definition of decommissioning in the context of
nuclear facilities includes references to the health and safety aspects of the activity.
Application of this definition in Germany, which has no analogous decommission-
ing definition in its law, might be redundant since health and safety in radiological
protection are covered elsewhere in the country's legislation. Horbach &
Hanenburg, supra note 6, at 31.
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ity is clearly not prepared to incorporate IAEA recommendations
into internationally-binding standards.2
This absence of binding international standards is a problem
confronting those countries that desire to adopt such standards and
thereby benefit from an international interdependence among
nuclear programs. Thus, a need exists for uniform and binding
international nuclear legislation.22 An adequate framework for
such a body of legislation could be based upon a number of
national models which have been successfully applied in Western
countries.23 However, given its proximity to the Central and
Eastern European countries, it would appear that Western Europe
maintains the greatest interest in assuring the safe operation of
Soviet-designed nuclear installations. While it has been noted that
the countries of the European Union are themselves moving
quickly toward an integrated nuclear market,24 it has also been
noted that as a whole, the EU possesses the largest combined
operational experience in the industrialized world.25 As it encour-
ages the harmonization of licensing, operation, and maintenance
standards among its member states, the EU recognizes that a sound
policy of nuclear safety must also include improvements in the
safety of nuclear installations in Central and Eastern Europe.26
For these reasons, it would seem that the most appropriate
framework for a binding international model of nuclear legislation
would reflect the challenges which already present themselves
through the integration activities of the European Union.
With such a requirement in mind, this Comment will examine
both national and international legal frameworks as they relate to
the production of nuclear energy in France and Germany. Part II
of this Comment will provide an overview of the two contrasting
nuclear energy regimes as they relate to each country's traditional
organizational structure. Part III will provide an analytic compari-
son of the legal frameworks associated with nuclear licensing and
construction activities. Part IV will follow with a similar analysis
focusing on activities related to the operation of nuclear facilities.
In Part V, a brief comparison will outline the limited development
21. Elbaradei, supra note 12.
22. This need is greatest in the decommissioning of existing plants, since
legislation in this field is largely absent. Horbach & Hanenburg, supra note 6, at
29.
23. Id. at 47.
24. Nuclear Industries in the European Union, supra note 1.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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of French and German decommissioning frameworks. Finally, Part
VI will discuss prospects for continued harmonization of the French
and German nuclear regimes, proposing measures for the develop-
ment of a model legal framework for nuclear activities.
France and Germany are to be examined for a variety of
reasons. Both are among the largest and most influential countries
of the European Union. As founding members of the EU, their
long affiliation implies a relatively advanced state of integration.
The unitary style of French government presents a sharp contrast
to the federal structure of Germany, presenting further aspects for
examination. Finally, a model based on the harmonization of
French and German programs may be the most crucial of all
comparative models, as France and Germany are the two largest
producers of nuclear energy within the European Union.27 An
examination of the harmonization prospects revealed in such a
model requires an analysis that systematically compares the safety
and licensing practices of the examined countries." This examina-
tion begins with a comparison of the contrasting energy regimes of
France and Germany.
II. Energy Regimes in France and Germany
Industrialized countries use nuclear energy to produce
electricity for public consumption. Regimes that govern electricity
production share two fundamental aspects: (1) they reflect the
country's basic principles of politics, economics, and social
organization; and (2) they represent an attempt to settle problems
of law and administration which are inherent in all societies. 29 In
nearly every country, a variety of laws govern energy production
simultaneously.3" Resulting energy regimes are therefore com-
prised of a composite of legislation.31 For this reason, it is not
surprising that the degree of territorial independence in a State's
energy policy will have a considerable effect on an existing legal
27. During 1996, France produced 378.20 TW(e).h from nuclear production,
representing over 77% of its total civil electricity production. During the same
year, Germany produced 152.8 TW(e).h which accounted for just over 30% of its
total production. Nuclear Power Status in 1996 (visited Nov. 7, 1997). <http:-
//www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/inforesource/pressrelease/prn0697.html>.
28. Schwarzer, supra note 9, at 11.
29. U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, LEGAL AND ADMINISTRA-
TIVE FRAMEWORKS FOR ELECTRICITY ENTERPRISES at 11, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA-
/169, U.N. Sales No. E.73.II.A.1 (1973).
30. Id. at 4.
31. Id.
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regime." For this analysis, a line can be drawn between the
highly centralized unitary structure in France and the federal
structure of Germany.
A. France
In keeping with its tradition of unitary government, France
maintains a highly centralized nuclear energy regime. Although the
State itself does not operate the country's nuclear facilities, this
responsibility is vested in the country's single utility company,
Electricitd de France (EDF).33 While the French government
maintains ownership of this corporate body, EDF is itself a distinct
entity separate from the state. Thai EDF continues in this capacity
reveals much about the tradition of centralization in the French
State. Following the Second World War, French authorities
entrusted EDF with temporary management responsibility over all
production and distribution activities in France.34
Early plans were made to eventually vest regional distribution
authority to independent administrative bodies.3" However, these
plans were apparently less compatible with the existing French
tradition of centralization. The proposed regional administrations
never developed, and by the early 1970s, EDF continued to operate
as the sole French electric utility.
36
This status allowed EDF to play a central role in dramatic
policy shifts that were then forthcoming. In 1973, France initiated
an ambitious program37 under which the country began a radical
shift toward the construction of nuclear power plants. Under this
initiative, thirty-four new reactors were expected to be completed
by the year 2000,38 and by 1996, a total of fifty-seven units were
in operation.39 In embarking on a nuclear program of such
32. Id. at 16.
33. Michel L6vy, French Administrative Action for Nuclear Safety: Principles,
Organization, Experience and Recent Developments, in 6 UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE FOR THE PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE
PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY TECHNICAL REPORTS 14 (1987).
34. LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORKS, supra note 29, at 37.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. L6vy, supra note 33, at 14.
38. M. Panossian & M. Bacher, French Nuclear Power Plants: Reactor Design
and Development, in 2 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE FOR THE PROMOTION OF
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
TECHNICAL REPORTS 27, 27-28 (1987).
39. Nuclear Power Status in 1996 (visited Nov. 7,1997) <http://www.iaea.or.at/-
worldatorn/inforesource/pressrelease/pm0697.html>.
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enormous magnitude, a highly centralized administrative structure
was crucial given the technical challenges of development, particu-
larly in areas of nuclear safety.4" Along with the French Atomic
Energy Commission (CEA), which was the sole industrial group
responsible for various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, EDF was
one of only two industrial concerns managing the French initia-
tive.41 This restriction thus enabled the French program to
achieve its objective for centralization.42
This restrictive approach became a characteristic of the entire
French nuclear program. French nuclear construction was itself
highly standardized.43 All new French reactors were to be of a
single type, each limited to one of only three power levels.' The
manufacturing of nuclear facilities was also restricted to only two
companies: Framatome, which became the major nuclear compon-
ent supplier,45 and Alsthom-Atlantique, which became the primary
manufacturer of conventional components.'
While administration would rest with a handful of corporate
bodies, the policies behind the French program were to stem from
the government itself. In 1973, the Central Nuclear Facility Safety
Service (SCSIN) was established as an organ within the French
Ministry for Industry.47 Since its establishment, the SCSIN has
assumed the roles of evaluating and implementing French nuclear
safety policy, performing research and development, advising other
entities such as the CEA with respect to the national energy
program, and informing the public as to nuclear energy-related
matters. 48 In partnership with the CEA and EDF, the SCSIN also
participates in the nuclear administrative process. 49  As this
relationship has developed, it has been observed that centralized
action has come to be exercised through three complementary
channels: (1) drafting of specific technical regulations; (2) supervi-
sion of the licensing process as applied to each individual nuclear
facility through the stages of construction, operation, and decom-
40. LEvy, supra note 33, at 17.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Panossian, supra note 38, at 27.
44. Id. at 28.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Ievy, supra note 33, at 14.
48. Decree on the Organization of the Central Administration of the Ministry
for Industry (1993), 53 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 81 (1994).
49. Ldvy, supra note 33, at 14-15.
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mission; and (3) surveillance of existing facilities.5" While these
channels reflect the centralized nature of the French regime, they
also reflect a limited decentralization which exists and which has
been deemed somewhat desirable.51 However, this decentraliza-
tion is limited to minor services geographically close to the
individual nuclear installations." It follows that in governing
France's mammoth nuclear establishment, the overwhelming bulk
of policy and administrative action originates from the central
authorities.
B. Germany
Unlike France, Germany's federal organization of government
divides a substantial amount of executive and legislative authority
between its federal (Bund) and state (Land) governments. Federal
States provide .more complicated energy regime models since
technical and economic requirements for efficient energy produc-
tion tend to conflict with division of power principles between
central and local governments.5 3 This predicament is explicit in
the German Constitution, which stipulates that the peaceful
utilization of nuclear energy, including the construction and
operation of such nuclear facilities, shall be governed under the
concurrent powers of the Lander and Bund.5 4 The various Lander
may exercise their legislative authority only to the extent that the
Bund has not legislated.5 5 Thus, the Bund maintains the option
of preemption over Lander legislative activity in the field of nuclear
energy. Still, the Constitution requires Lander involvement,
stipulating that Bund'enacted laws pertaining to nuclear energy
must be executed, with parliamentary consent, by the Lander acting
as agents of the Bund.16 It follows that regardless of the auton-
omy ultimately vested in regional authorities, Lander involvement
becomes an inherent part of the German nuclear energy regime,
reflecting the country's decentralized political system.
This decentralization characterizes the German nuclear
establishment. Unlike the French model, in which all responsibility
50. Id. at 15.
51. Id. at 17. Lvy notes that represented decentralization stems from the
Ministry of Industry's regional directorates. Id. at 15. These regional directorates
are given some limited responsibilities with respect to nuclear safety. Id. at 17.
52. Lvy, supra note 33, at 17.
53. LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORKS, supra note 29, at 18.
54. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 74 (F.R.G.).
55. GG art. 72 (F.R.G.).
56. GG art. 87c (F.R.G.).
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is vested in EDF, no single entity controls the production,
transmission, and distribution of electricity throughout Germany.
Instead, a number of large, private companies dominate the
country's energy sector.57 In spite of the Bund's efforts to the
contrary, these utilities maintain monopolies which impede the
development of competitive energy supplies.58 Still, these mono-
polies are restricted to their respective regions throughout the
country.59 Only the nuclear manufacturing element of Germany's
establishment appears to share the level of standardization enjoyed
by its French counterpart. While most German nuclear reactors
originate from a single vendor,' there has been at least one
exception to this trend.61
As a consequence of this decentralization, German government
authorities exercise less influence over their domestic nuclear
programs than do their French counterparts. 62 However, both
Bund and Lander governments assume a number of administrative
responsibilities over the country's program as a whole. It is the
responsibility of the Bund to coordinate national nuclear policy.
63
Unlike France, this task is delegated to a number of separate
ministries, each having simultaneous administrative responsi-
bilities.64 The Federal Ministry for Economics (BMWi), carries
the most direct role as the organ responsible for establishing
national energy policy.65 Decommissioning activities are super-
vised by the Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF). Administration of
nuclear research and development is undertaken by the Federal
Ministry for Education, Science, Research and Technology
(BMBF).66 However, it is the Federal Ministry of Environment,
57. Germany: Environmental Review (last modified July 1995) <http://www.-
eia.doe.gov/emeu/env/germany.html>.
58. Report of the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 2.
59. Id.
60. A. Birkhofer et al., French Nuclear Power Plants: Reactor Design and
Development, in 4 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE FOR THE PROMOTION OF
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
TECHNICAL REPORTS 1, 2 (1987).
61. Id.
62. Germany: Environmental Review, supra note 57. However, the German
Energy Information Administration maintains that the Federal Government has
been influential in gaining the utilities' cooperation in pursuing objectives of
national policy. Id.
63. Germany-Fact Sheet (last modified Sept. 30, 1995) <http://etd.pnl.gov:-
2080/fac/germany/factsheet.html>.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) which takes the
most comprehensive role, supervising both the licensing procedures
of Lander governments and addressing various aspects of radiation
protection.67
Lander responsibilities include the implementation of nuclear
policies established by the Bund. This still allows for a great
degree of variation in policy among the various Lander. For
example, while licensing requirements are generally established by
the Bund through the BMU, licensing is also a concurrent task of
each of the Ldnder.68
Though smaller than the nuclear regime of France, Germany's
nuclear program has enabled the country to operate a sizable
collection of nineteen operational stations producing approximately
thirty percent of the country's electricity.69 Still, the program
remains a model of decentralized authority and regional influences.
As is the case in France, these influences reflect national traditions
and form the basis of nuclear legislation as it relates to the
conception, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear facilities.
III. Processes of Nuclear Licensing and Construction
In most industrial countries, electricity producers must obtain
a legal entitlement prior to the commencement of a major
electrical undertaking.7 ° In the case of nuclear energy, most
countries also require that strict control be vested in public
authorities, which must impose strict regulations and legal provi-
sions before any proposed nuclear undertaking may proceed.71
While nuclear energy regimes employ strikingly different legal
mechanisms in exercising this control,72 most regimes share similar
policy objectives in granting entitlements, such as construction and
67. Id.
68. Germany-Fact Sheet, supra note 63.
69. Report of the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 2.
70. LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORKS, supra note 29, at 26.
71. Id. at 22.
72. Id. at 26.
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operating licenses, to producers.73 This is true in both France and
Germany.
A. France
In France, strict administrative control over matters of nuclear
safety developed parallel to the underlying goals of efficiency and
credibility, which came to characterize the country's ambitious
nuclear program.74 The French Government assumed its nuclear
administrative authority relatively early, first passing an ordinance
in 1945 creating the establishment of protective measures and later
subjecting all basic nuclear installations (INBs), to government
authorization after 1963.75
The initial phase of the French authorization process is the
grant of a construction license decree, which specifies the general
requirements for licensing a proposed nuclear facility.76 Before
the construction of any new facility may begin, an application for
authorization must be sent directly to the Ministry of Industry.77
As the government body most directly involved in the licensing and
construction process, 78 the Ministry of Industry retains the direct
power to issue nuclear licenses. 79 Within the ministry, the SCSIN
exercises ministerial procedures relating to nuclear safety.8 °
73. In a paper presented at the Regional Seminar in Nuclear Law for Latin
American Countries held in Rio de Janeiro in June, 1973, Ha-Vinh Phuong of the
International Atomic Energy Agency's Legal Division contrasted the regimes of
established nuclear energy countries with those of up-and-coming nuclear states
which had not yet established broad legal frameworks for the administration of
nuclear energy. Phuong suggested two nuclear licensing objectives for all energy
regimes: (1) nuclear licensing standards should reasonably assure safe operation
without unduly compromising public safety; and (2) standards should allow for
both technical feasibility and minimal public and environmental exposure without
compromising the economic advantages of nuclear facilities. Ha-Vinh Phuong,
Legislative Framework and Regulatory Requirements for the Introduction of
Nuclear Power, in LICENSING AND REGULATORY CONTROL OF NUCLEAR
INSTALLATIONS 3, 4 (1975).
74. Levy, supra note 33, at 15.
75. Id. at 14.
76. Id. at 23.
77. MICHAEL DESPAX & WILLIAM COULET, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL; ENVI-
RONMENT, CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND NUCLEAR SAFETY, COMMISSION FOR
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO POLLU-
TION CONTROL IN FRANCE 113 (2d. ed. 1982).
78. Levy, supra note 33, at 15.
79. See Decree Concerning the Release of Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from,
and the Use of Water by Large Nuclear Installations (1995), 56 NUCLEAR L. BULL.
77, 78 (1995). The ministry currently derives its authority under the decree of May
5, 1995, No. 95-540. Id.
80. L6vy, supra note 33, at 15.
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Authorization for a proposed facility is granted through a draft
decree process in which the SCSIN submits the proposed facility to
a group of technical experts specializing in the facility's proposed
design.81 Upon approval by this expert group, a preliminary copy
of the license decree is drafted and submitted to an interminsterial
commission, comprised of representatives from various bodies of
the French Government.82 The draft decree is then amended
prior to its submission to the Prime Minister for signature.83
Throughout this process, all parties involved in evaluating the
proposed facility rely on a preliminary safety report which must be
included with the initial application.' This report must contain an
updated file of the applicant's proposed means for compliance
relating to existing nuclear legislation85 with respect to design,
construction, and initial reactor testing.86 Compliance must extend
from the design phase until decommissioning,87 and the applicant
must also keep the file updated throughout the authorization
process.88 In meeting this obligation, the applicant also reserves the
right to exact any pertinent information from his suppliers.
89
In considering the initial safety report, the Ministry of Industry
is obliged to consider the opinions of the department where the
proposed facility is to be located.90 While the authorization
process centers on the central government authorities, applications
are subject to local inquiries as part of the draft decree process.91
These public consultations are also provided to surrounding and
adjacent localities where it is deemed that the effects of the
proposed facility will extend beyond the borders of the local
department or commune.92 However, the practical impact of these
81. Id. at 16.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Order of 10th August 1984 on Design, Quality, Construction, and Operation
of Large Nuclear Installations (1984), 35 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 60, 62 (1985).
86. Trade Circular of 10th August 1984 Relative to Enforcement of the Large
Nuclear Installation Design, Construction, and Operating Quality Regulations
(1984), 35 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 68, 72 (1985).
87. Order of 10th August 1984 on Design, Quality, Construction, and Operation
of Large Nuclear Installations (1984), 35 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 60, 61 (1985).
88. Id. at 62.
89. Trade Circular of 10th August 1984, supra note 85.
90. L6vy, supra note 33, at 16.
91. Id.
92. See Decree Concerning the Release of Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from,
and the Use of Water by Large Nuclear Installations (1995), 56 NUCLEAR L. BULL.
77, 80 (1995).
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inquiries may be limited, since public inquiries are only one part
of the licensing procedure and are optional under certain condi-
tions.93  Still, even where a public inquiry is not part of the
authorization process, licensing decrees must still contain provisions
for providing the public with information about the new facility.94
In addition to construction licensing decrees, the French
authorization process is also subject to both orders and directives
from the Ministry of Industry. Ministerial orders relate to
generalized issues of technical refinements and safety.95  In
contrast, directives issued through the Ministry of Industry relate
more closely to fundamental concepts associated with the construc-
tion of nuclear reactors.96
While a number of channels exist for enacting regulations
governing the licensing and construction of nuclear installations, the
French regime also allows for great flexibility in applying those
regulations. Whether set- forth by licensing decree, ministerial
directive or order, French nuclear regulations are ultimately
subordinate to the. judgment of the Ministry of Industry, which
retains an enormous amount of discretion in the regulatory
procedure.97 Under the French regime, the applicable standards
of quality for a given nuclear undertaking must reflect the specific
93. THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO POLLUTION CONTROL IN
FRANCE, supra note 77, at 113. For example, applications are not subject to public
inquiry where the application conforms to an earlier inquiry and is made prior to
a "declaration Qf public benefit." Id. Another example arises in cases where the
effects of proposed facilities extend beyond department borders. In these cases,
the decision of whether to hold a public inquiry in another department is under
the discretion of the local department administrator or "Pr6fet." See Decree
Concerning the Release of Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from, and the Use of
Water by Large Nuclear Installations (1995), 56 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 77, 80 (1995).
94. Decree Concerning the Release of Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from, and
the Use of Water by Large Nuclear Installations (1995), 56 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 77,
80 (1995).
95. L6vy, supra note 33, at 23. For example, one United Nations Technical
Report refers to issues of reactor circuit design and construction quality as areas
befitting regulation through ministerial order. Id.
96. Id. An example of an area suited to ministerial directive would be the
safety "obligations and features".. associated with particular power levels of
standardized reactor units. Id. This distinction is crucial in the context of the
French nuclear regime given its high level of standardization.
97. Two principles have been identified which characterize this relative status:
(1) French regulations have evolved so that their purpose is to set forth "a number
of fundamental guidelines" which are deemed essential for operation, though not
necessarily sufficient in themselves to assure acceptable safety levels; and (2)
French regulations represent the regime's fixed goals, though not necessarily
prescribing the means to achieve those goals. Ldvy, supra note 33, at 23.
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safety needs of the individual project.98 Ultimately, the decision
for granting an operating license rests with the SCSIN.99 Such
authorization may not be granted until the operator first submits an
additional final safety report, including proposals for regulating the
facility's permanent operation.1l°  Even where a new facility
adheres to existing regulations and meets all necessary technical
requirements, the SCSIN may, at its discretion, require that the
facility meet additional technical requirements before the Ministry
of Industry authorizes operation.101 The SCSIN also retains the
authority to supplant existing fundamental safety regulations in
favor of alternative measures wherever it deems that such alterna-
tive measures are necessary for safety 0°
The French judicial process has apparently taken the regime's
flexibility to heart. Appeals to French administrative courts have
been based on challenges to the legality of the construction
licensing decrees themselves." 3 Such appeals have been unsuc-
cessful where arguments have centered on narrow interpretation of
international law."°  These challenges have also been refused
where construction license decrees have been argued to be contrary
to the public interest.10 5  In considering these challenges, the
French courts have found that the country's need for a secure
energy supply clearly outweighs other contrary public interest argu-
ments.10 6 The courts have extended this notion even where the
requested authorization relates primarily to future nuclear develop-
ment. In one such appeal, groups from Switzerland challenged the
French government's authorization of the largely experimental
Superphnix fast breeder reactor located near the Franco-Swiss
98. See Trade Circular of 10th August 1984, supra note 85, at 69.
99. THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO POLLUTION CONTROL IN
FRANCE, supra note 77, at 117.
100. L6vy, supra note 33, at 16.
101. THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO POLLUTION CONTROL IN
FRANCE, supra note 77, at 117.
102. L6vy, supra note 33, at 24. The French Government intends to achieve
two policy goals in vesting this broad authority to the SCSIN: (1) to avoid hamper-
ing the development of technology; and (2) to further the development of
standardization within the country's nuclear program. Id. Thus, the SCSIN's
broad authority relates directly to the overall objectives of France's ambitious
nuclear development strategy.
103. THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO POLLUTION CONTROL IN
FRANCE, supra note 77, at 115.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
1998] THE FRENCH AND GERMAN NUCLEAR ENERGY REGIMES 705
border. °7 The court's subsequent dismissal was based on the fact
that the reactor's operation was a necessary part of France's
twenty-first century energy preparation.0 8
This notion of flexibility complements a gradual trend toward
legal simplification, which has come to increasingly characterize the
French nuclear regime. In one such effort, the French Government
introduced a highly flexible "special regime" governing the
installation of smaller INBs.10 9 Under this "special regime," an
applicant whose proposed facility meets prescribed requirements
may be excluded from certain interministerial controls."0  The
application also becomes exempt from the normal local inquiry
requirement.'' In a more recent development, the government
abolished an earlier provision that required a preliminary study as
part of the authorization procedure."2 This procedural simplifica-
tion in fact removed a cumbersome obstacle to new licensing
applications."' In pursuing this course of legal simplification
within an already highly centralized regime, the French Govern-
ment has enabled prospective applications to move through the
authorization process with great expediency. As a result, the
country's ambitious nuclear program has been able to proceed even
further toward its ultimate goal of harmonization and efficiency.
B. Germany
While Germany's federal structure does not vest executive
responsibilities in any one central body,114 nuclear activities within
the country are governed under the federal Atomgesetz (German
107. Council of State's Judgment of 28 February 1997 on Superphenix, 59
NUCLEAR L. BULL. 33, 33 (1997).
108. Id.
109. THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO POLLUTION CONTROL IN
FRANCE, supra note 77, at 114.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Decree Concerning the Release of Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from, and
the Use of Water by Large Nuclear Installations (1995), 56 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 77,
79 (1995).
113. Id.
114. OECD/NEA SECRETARIAT, A Survey of Different Regulatory Practices,
in LICENSING AND REGULATORY CONTROL OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS 255,
271 (1975).
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Atomic Energy Act) of 1959115 as amended in 1985116 and
1994.117 As in France, the German statute requires that authori-
zation be obtained prior to the construction or operation of any
installation utilizing fissionable fuels."n Under the Atomgesetz,
both Bund and Lander governments participate in the licensing
procedure for new nuclear facilities.119 However, the authoriza-
tions themselves are ultimately granted by Lander authorities.2
These authorizations are themselves divided into partial licenses,
covering separate aspects of the construction process, and are
granted separately as construction proceeds.121
German Federal.Law requires that an-applicant submit his
license application directly to the local licensing authority.22 It
is then up to the authority, which must be of the Land where the
installation is to be constructed,123 to conduct the first phase of
the licensing process. At this stage, the Land conducts many of the
activities which would be conducted by the central authorities in
France. These activities include providing for public discussions
and consultations with expert groups and other local author-
ities.124  However, before rendering a partial license, the Land
first consults with the authorities of the Bund. 15  Within the
Bund, the task of supervising the Land's licensing procedure is
delegated to the Ministry for Education, Science, Research and
115. Gesetz iber die friedliche Verwendung der Kernenergie und den Schutz
gegen ihre Gefahren (Atomgesetz), v. 23.12.1959 (BGB1. I S.814).
116. Fassung der Bekanntmachung, v. 15.7.1985 (BGBI. I S.1565).
117. Siebentes Anderungsgesetz, v. 19.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1618, 1622)
118. Sec. 7 Nr. 1 Atomgesetz. Facilities located in the former German Demo-
cratic Republic which received authorization prior to 1990 are now also subject to
the Federal Republic's licensing regime. The 1994 Atomgesetz revision provides
that licenses granted prior to 1990 were to expire as of June 30, 1995. Id. § 57a
Nr. 1.
119. Id. § 7 Nr. 4.
120. L.F. Franzen, Safety Criteria and Procedural Steps Connected with the
Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants in the Federal Republic of Germany, in
LICENSING AND REGULATORY CONTROL OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS 39, 51
(1975). The Linder bodies responsible for actually granting licenses varies by
Land, but the power is most often vested in the local ministry of commerce, acting
in conjunction with other state ministries. Id.
121. Id. at 53.
122. Consolidated Text of the 1977 Ordinance on the Procedure for Licensing
Nuclear Installations, Dated 31st March 1982, 30 NUCLEAR L. BULL. (Supp. 3) 4
(1982).
123. Franzen, supra note 120, at 52.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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Technology (BMU).'26 In examining the application, the BMU
draws on the expert opinions of its own advisory groups.2 7 The
ministry must then submit its licensing decision based on the
requirements of the Atomgesetz and all other relevant legisla-
tion.12 8 Upon the grant of any license, the facility remains under
the supervision of the local licensing authority throughout its
operational life.
129
As in France, all parties involved in the German authorization
process rely on a preliminary safety report which must be included
in the application materials upon their submission to the local
authorities. 3 ' The report must include the .proposed facility's
design and safety characteristics,' as well as a description of the
expected health and environmental effects associated with the
facility's installation and operation. 112 Further, the applicant must
provide the licensing authority with additional information
whenever the authority determines that such information is
needed."3
Under German law, the specific purpose of the preliminary
safety report is to benefit third parties so that such parties may
themselves determine whether their rights would be adversely
affected." Upon receipt of a completed application, the local
licensing authority must announce the proposal to the general
public."5  Rather than conduct a public inquiry, the licensing
authority must accept any written objections to the proposed
facility and provide for a private hearing.136 Every party submit-
ting a written complaint is entitled to present its objection at this
126. Germany-Fact Sheet, supra note 63.
127. Franzen, supra note 120, at 56.
128. Consolidated Text of the 1977 Ordinance on the Procedure for Licensing
Nuclear Installations, Dated 31st March 1982, 30 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 10 (Supp. 3
1982).
129. Franzen, supra note 120, at 55.
130. Consolidated Text of the 1977 Ordinance on the Procedure for Licensing
Nuclear Installations, Dated 31st March 1982, 30 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 4 (Supp. 3
1982).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 5. This description must also include any expected effects of possible
accidents. Id. at 4.
133. Id. at 5.
134. Consolidated Text of the 1977 Ordinance on the Procedure for Licensing
Nuclear Installations, Dated 31st March 1982, 30 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 4 (Supp. 3
1982).
135. Id. at 5.
136. Id. at 7.
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hearing.137 While the French nuclear regime limits the practical
impact of such consultation, all proposals in Germany are subject
to such public scrutiny, which ultimately affects the procedural
outcome.
138
In considering the public's criticisms, the licensing authorities
must evaluate the proposed license according to applicable
regulations and standards. As is the case in France, nuclear
regulations in Germany are issued directly from central authorities
and in most cases originate from the Bund itself1 39 In compar-
ison, safety standards may be issued either by the Bund or by
another body acting in conjunction with the Bund and are intended
to embody interpretations of Atomgesetz provisions.1" However,
the fact that standards, unlike regulations, do not originate solely
from the Bund complicates their implementation. For example,
Regulatory Guides, which include safety criteria and guidelines for
adherence to radiation protection ordinances, are issued by the
BMU only after a process of outside consultation.14  Guidelines
established by the Nuclear Reactor Safety Commission (RSK)
originate from intergovernmental consultation and are eventually
replaced with Safety Standards issued by the Nuclear Safety
Standards Commission (KTA).'42 These KTA Safety Standards
are also subject to additional procedural rules related to their
enactment.
1 43
Surprisingly, the judicial process in Germany provides the local
authorities with a high level of flexibility in applying these
standards and regulations. Given the Lander responsibility of
implementing federal laws on behalf of the Bund, it has been
suggested that the Bund must draft standards such that Lander
authorities will be willing to carry out their enforcement.1" The
regime also shields existing standards and regulations from judicial
challenges. Pre-enforcement review is not provided until the
137. Id. at 9.
138. See id. at 10.
139. See § 54 Nr. 1 Atomgesetz. Even those regulations not issued directly by
the legislature are to be issued by the federal ministry responsible for nuclear
safety and radiation protection. Id. These ministerial regulations are subject to
approval by the Federal Council. Id. at Nr. 2.
140. Schwarzer, supra note 9, at 9.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. SUSAN ROSE-AACKERMAN, CONTROLLING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC LAW IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 67 (1995).
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standard or regulation has been subject to actual litigation.145
Once a challenge is permitted, individuals and organizations may
only pursue their claim upon showing a violation of their rights. 46
For example, in 1996, the Administrative Court of Appeal of
Lineburg, the highest administrative court in Lower-Saxony,
dismissed an appeal by residents living in the vicinity of a nuclear
installation who challenged a partial license 47  The appeal
centered on the residents' claim that the license had been granted
in violation of procedural rules, had been granted without consider-
ation of available health and environmental information and was
not based on existing regulations. 4 ,8 -The, court dismissed the
appeal, holding that the residents' claim had not sufficiently
established that their rights had been breached during the defective
licensing procedure. 49 The court could not substitute its own
judgment for that of the licensing authority and was limited to
verifying that the authority had sufficiently justified its decision.5 '
In spite of this apparent flexibility, recent legislative develop-
ments have placed a severe limitation on the granting of future
nuclear licenses. As amended in 1994, the Atomgesetz now
requires that applicants for new licenses provide proof regarding
the inherent safety characteristics of their proposed facility.' 5'
Under the new provision, the applicant must prove that upon the
occurrence of a catastrophic event such as a reactor core meltdown,
the proposed reactor would not allow for the release of ionizing
radiation.'52 The applicant must also prove that such an event
would not require a mass evacuation of areas surrounding the
proposed installation.'53 While the development of such a reactor
is currently well under way, future authorizations in Germany will
need to wait for the introduction of the next generation of nuclear
plants.'54 In this respect, Germany's existing nuclear legal frame-
145. Id. at 72.
146. Id.
147. The Highest Administrative Court of Lower-Saxony Rejects an Appeal
Against the Licensing of the Storage of Nuclear Waste and of Irradiated Fuel
Elements, 58 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 71 (1996).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Sec. 2a Atomgesetz.
152. Id.
153. See id. This provision, however, does not apply to facilities in operation
prior to 1993. Id.
154. Report of the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 2. One design that
would meet this requirement is the European Pressurized Reactor (EPR), which
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work has clearly surpassed the country's current technological
capacity.
IV. Frameworks for the Operation of Nuclear Facilities
The legal frameworks surrounding the operation of nuclear
facilities are highly interconnected with those surrounding nuclear
construction and licensing. Even so, a number of additional legal
issues relate directly to the operational aspects of nuclear facilities.
Due to the scale and potential hazards associated with the
utilization of nuclear energy, a country that commits itself to
nuclear development must also assume an irreversible obligation
for many decades.'55 For this reason, it is essential that a State
utilizing nuclear energy establish and maintain an effective
administration for monitoring its nuclear program.15 6 It is also
essential that the State adopt a system to protect the public from
the financial consequences of nuclear-related damages.157 Efforts
on the part of both France and Germany have increasingly sought
further harmonization in both nuclear safety and third party
liability, though both countries continue to maintain contrasting
individual legal frameworks in both fields.
A. France
As in construction and licensing, centralized authorities
maintain ultimate legal control in the operation of French nuclear
installations. As reorganized in 1993, the Ministry of Industry,
acting with the Ministry of the Environment, is vested with the
legal authority to undertake measures aimed at minimizing harmful
effects related to nuclear energy production.5 ' Actual monitor-
ing of operator discharges is carried out by the Office for Protec-
tion Against Ionizing Radiation (OPRI), which is also responsible
for exercising technical control related to radioactive pollution.159
is currently undergoing a joint French-German development effort. Id.
155. Technical Requirements for a Nuclear Power Programme, in 2 UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE FOR THE PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY TECHNICAL REPORTS 118 (1987).
156. Id.
157. Phuong, supra note 73, at 7.
158. Decree on the Organization of the Central Administration of the Ministry
for Industry (1993), 53 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 81 (1994). The Ministry of Industry
exercises this authority through its subunit, the DGEMP, which in turn operates
the Directorate for the Safety of Nuclear Installations. Id.
159. The OPRI assumes this responsibility as successor to the Central Service
for Protection Against Ionizing Radiation (SCPRI). Decree Concerning the
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Under French Law, the monitoring activities are themselves
exercised by the nuclear operator who must account to the
government authority to ensure that the activities conform to the
government's applicable authorization decrees.1" As part of the
monitoring routine, the operator himself must report directly to th&
SCSIN all incidents which may affect the level of safety at the
facility."' The government's monitoring is then carried out by
inspectors, and sanctions may be imposed where the inspections
reveal noncompliance with provisions of the facility's authorization
decree.162 These sanctions are intended to return the installation
to a safe operating level and may include. suspension of the
facility's operation.1 63  Where an incident has occurred during
operation, a follow-up report of the incident must be sent to the
SCSIN within two months after the occurrence."6 Such a report
must also be submitted after periodic shut-downs and reactor
modifications. 65
A fundamental feature of the French nuclear regime involves
the notion that in performing surveillance activities, government
authorities should not replace the operator as the party ultimately
responsible for monitoring safety.1" In keeping with this concept,
owners of nuclear facilities are explicitly responsible for enforcing
legal provisions relating to "quality-relevant" issues under French
law. 6 For this reason, it has been suggested that in France,
government surveillance should be limited to verification of a
facility's conformity through periodic spot-checks conducted
through a systematic process."6  However, government efforts
aimed at maintaining this surveillance framework have in fact led
to a gradual and uncharacteristically French pattern of decentraliza-
tion among regional industry and research directorates.169 Still,
Release of Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from, and the Use of Water by Large
Nuclear Installations (1995), 56 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 77, 78-9 (1995).
160. THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO POLLUTION CONTROL IN
FRANCE, supra note 77, at 119.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 120.
163. Id.
164. Ldvy, supra note 33, at 20.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 21.
167. Order of 10th August 1984 on Design, Quality, Construction, and Operation
of Large Nuclear Installations (1984), 35 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 60, 62 (1985).
168. Ldvy, supra note 33, at 23.
169. Id. at 22. L6vy attributes this to an increase in inspection resources which
became available to safety authorities in the late 1970s and 1980s. Id.
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in providing increased efficiency for the overall inspection pro-
cess,17 ° this pattern of decentralization has actually contributed to
a fundamental objective of the French nuclear regime.
The regime's existing framework in the field of operational
ihonitoring has also been complemented with international
legislative measures. In 1994, France signed -the Convention on
Nuclear Safety"' which the country approved on September 13,
1995 and which entered into force on October 24, 1996.172 The
convention, which has been ratified by over twenty-two countries,
includes international provisions for verifications of safety,173
quality assurance,17" radiation protection, 175 responsibilities to
be vested in holders of nuclear licenses,176 and provisions for the
establishment of legislative and regulatory frameworks for signato-
ries' nuclear programs.177 As a member of the European Atomic
Energy Community, France's monitoring activities are also bound
by the radiation protection provisions of the Euratom Treaty.178
These provisions mandate, inter alia, the establishment of legislative
and regulatory provisions to uphold basic community radiation
standards179 and require member states to engage in the contin-
uous monitoring of environmental radioactivity.80
France's commitment to greater international frameworks also
extends to the country's third party liability regime. France is a
signatory of the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability,181
which contains internationally-binding provisions covering, inter
alia, liability of nuclear facility operators,8 2 compensation for
170. Id. Ldvy attributes this added efficiency to "geographical proximity of the
facilities." Id.
171. Convention on Nuclear Safety, Sept. 20, 1994 (visited Nov. 11, 1997)<http:-
//www.varam.gov.lvfEnglish/Radiation/Legal/ConvNucSaf.htm>.
172. Entry into Force of the Convention of Nuclear Safety (1996), 58 NUCLEAR
L. BULL. 136 (1996). Germany is also a signatory of the convention. Id. at 137.
173. Convention on Nuclear Safety, supra note 171, art. 14.
174. Id. at art. 13.
175. Id. at art. 15.
176. Id. at art. 9.
177. Id. at art. 7.
178. EURATOM TREATY arts. 30-39, 161.
179. Id. at art. 33.
180. Id. at art. 35.
181. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29th
July 1960, as Amended by the Additional Protocol of 28th January 1964 and by
the Protocol of 16th November 1982 (visited Nov. 12, 1997) <http://www.nea.fr/-
htmllaw/nlparisconv.html> [hereinafter Paris Convention].
182. Id. at arts. 3-4.
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nuclear-related damages,183 and limitations to liability.1" Addi-
tional provisions related to those of the Paris Convention have
been added under the Brussels Supplementary Convention,"5 and
together, provisions of the two treaties have been incorporated
directly into subsequent French legislation, particularly the Act of
October 30, 1968, as amended by the Act of June 16, 1990.186
This legislation exists specifically for the purpose of implementing
measures pursuant to the Paris and Brussels Conventions,
18 7
losing effect upon the Paris Convention's termination."8 8 As a
result of this legislation, the existing French liability regime now
holds nuclear facility operators strictly liable for damages even in
the absence of a major accident and even where the operator has
complied with all technical requirements of the facility's license.'89
Maximum liability for an operator is set at 600 million francs per
incident. 9 ° In accordance with provisions of the Brussels Con-
vention, the government is responsible for paying sums in excess of
the convention's limits19' where such limits are deemed insuffi-
cient to compensate victims.'9 2 In allocating these sums, compen-
sation for bodily injury receives priority over damages to prop-
erty.193 A strict statute of limitations also applies. In claiming
damages, victims must bring their claims within three years of a
nuclear incident 94 In order to guard against such claims, opera-
183. Id. at arts. 6-7.
184. Id. at arts. 5, 7-9.
185. Convention of 31st January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention
of 29th July 1960, as Amended by the Additional Protocol of 28th January 1964
and by the Protocol of 16th November 1982, (last updated Aug. 30, 1988)
<http://www.nea.fr/html/law/nlbrussels.htm> [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
186. Act No. 68-943 of 30th October 1968 on Third Party Liability in the Field
of Nuclear Energy, as Amended by Act No. 90-488 of l6th June 1990,46 NUCLEAR
L. BULL. (Supp. 3) 3 (1990).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 9.
189. THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO POLLUTION CONTROL IN
FRANCE, supra note 77, at 121.
190. Act No. 68-943 of 30th October 1968 on Third Party Liability in the Field
of Nuclear Energy, as Amended by Act No. 90-488 of 16th June 1990, 46 NUCLEAR
L. BULL. 3 (Supp. 3 1990). This maximum liability figure may be substantially
raised or lowered depending on the design or purpose of the facility. See Id. at
4.
191. Id. at 4.
192. Id. at 6.
193. Id. at 6.
194. Act No. 68-943 of 30th October 1968 on Third Party Liability in the Field
of Nuclear Energy, as Amended by Act No. 90-488 of 16th June 1990,46 NUCLEAR
L' BULL. 7 (Supp. 3 1990). An exception. to this requirement allows for claims to
be submitted after the statutory period where the victim becomes aware of the
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tors must maintain insurance for their maximum liability.
195
Failure to meet this requirement may subject the operator to both
criminal liability and suspension of the facility's operation.196
Incorporating the legal provisions of international nuclear
agreements into its own domestic legislation clearly brings much of
France's legislative framework in line with those of other countries.
While some legal aspects of France's nuclear monitoring continue
to reflect the individualized goals of the country's nuclear regime,
many operational aspects of the regime also demonstrate French
efforts that are clearly aimed at furthering international harmoniz-
ation.
B. Germany
The Atomgesetz similarly provides for government supervision
over most aspects of German nuclear operation.197 At the
Federal level, the BMU has the responsibility of implementing
preventive measures to ensure reactor safety and adequate
radiation protection. 98 Germany's, Preventive Radiation Protec-
tion Act also stipulates that implementation of these measures is
the responsibility' Of 'the Lander.199  However, the Bund still
maintains the right to issue statutory ordinances as well as
administrative regulations and to issue directives relating to matters
of legal importance and efficiency.200
Such ordinances cover numerous areas of radiation protection
and are often comprised of simple lists of maximums providing
allowable levels of radioactive emissions and exposures to the
public and environment.2 1
As it relates to the monitoring of nuclear activities, the
German regime is more highly subject to international frameworks
than is the regime in France. In Germany, enacted limits on
radioactive exposure are automatically subject to European Union
directives and the recommendations of the International Commis-
damage or injury only after the period has expired. However, in no case may a
claim be brought after fifteen years. Id.
195. Id. at 4.
196. Id. at 8.
197. Sec. 19 Nr. 1 Atomgesetz.
198. Act of 19th December 1986 to Provide for the Preventive Protection of the
Population Against Radiation, 39 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 43, 48 (1987) [hereinafter
Preventive Radiation Protection Act].
199. Id.
200. Franzen, supra note 120, at 40.
201. Id. at 43.
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sion on Radiation Protection.2 °2 This provides a general supervis-
ory basis for all German nuclear energy production. 3 The
recommendations of international bodies are also highly influential
to the German monitoring process. For example, recommendations
made by the International Commission on Radiological Protection
(ICRP) are given great weight by supervisory authorities due to
their factual basis. 2°4  While not legally binding on 'German
legislative practices, it has been noted that in time, the country's
legal framework ultimately conforms to such recommendations.2 5
The Atomgesetz serves as a predominant source of legislation
related to nuclear monitoring.2 ' 6 Under its provisions, the posses-
sion of nuclear fuels by non-government bodies requires a li-
cense,20 7 which may be revoked upon repeated violations of
Atomgesetz provisions or its associated regulations. 2 Agents of
the supervisory authorities may conduct inspections to assure
compliance and are entitled to unlimited access to all equipment,
places of material storage, and radioactive sources within a given
nuclear facility.2' As in France, all nuclear plants are subjected
to recurrent inspections upon commissioning.210 The supervisory
authority may revoke an operating license where an inspection
reveals a substantial risk to the public or environment and where
an imposed remedy cannot remove the risk within a reasonable
time.21 Both manufacturers and operators are responsible for
ensuring that their facilities are properly configured and accessible
to the supervisory authority for carrying out these inspections.
2 12
The Atomgesetz also provides a legislative framework for third
party liability in the operation of German facilities. By design, the
Atomgesetz incorporates specific elements of the Paris and Brussels
Conventions into its own legislative framework. 13 Under Ger-
man law, provisions of the Paris Convention are binding within
Germany regardless of whether they continue to be binding under
202. Report of the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 2.
203. Id.
204. Franzen, supra note 120, at 43.
205. Id.
206. Report of the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 2.
207. Sec. 6 Nr. 1 Atomgesetz.
208. Id. § 19 Nr. 1.
209. Id. § 19 Nr. 2
210. Franzen, supra note 120, at 51.
211. See § 17 Nr. 5 Atomgesetz.
212. Franzen, supra note 120, at 51.
213. See § 25 Nr. 1 Atomgesetz.
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international law.214 Thus, the resulting legal framework is based
on the combined provisions of the Paris Convention and Atom-
gesetz.
In many ways this framework mirrors that of France, while
retaining a number of classic German policy elements. Under the
German regime, Atomgesetz liability provisions supplement Paris
Convention provisions in cases where a German court has jurisdic-
tion over an operator in another Paris Convention State.215 The
Paris Convention's Article 3 operator liability provisions are also
extended under the German statute, which removes the conven-
tion's war, natural disaster, and territorial exceptions from German
application.216 The Atomgesetz explicitly preserves the Paris
Convention's Article 5(d) provisions for joint and several liabil-
ity,217 and also provides for claims based on contributory
fault.21 8 A statute of limitations requires victims to submit all
claims within three years of learning of their nuclear-related
injuries, and in any case within thirty years of the damaging
incident.219  As in France, German operators must insure their
facilities up to the amount of their maximum liability2 ° or face
revocation of their operating licenses. 2 21 However, the German
framework also employs a unique indemnification provision for
cases in which nuclear-related damages exceed an operator's
maximum liability. In such cases, the Bund and Linder share the
costs of indemnification, the Bund providing seventy-five percent
of the required funds and the Lander paying the remaining twenty-
five percent.
222
In spite of such differences, the ultimate effect which the Paris
Convention has had on the German regime is clear. Though
limited by certain fundamental policy concepts inherent in the
contrasting regimes, a pattern of harmonization exists in which
aspects of the German nuclear framework have come in line with
214. Id.
215. Id. § 40 Nr. 1.
216. Id. § 25 Nrs. 3-5.
217. Id. § 35 Nr. 1.
218. Sec. 27 Nr. 1. Atomgesetz.
219. Id. § 32 Nr. 1. For claims brought under Article 8(b) of the Paris
Convention, the thirty-year limitation is reduced to within twenty years of the
nuclear-related incident. Id. § 32 Nr. 2.
220. This is a fixed liability limited to 500 million DM. Id. § 13 Nr. 3.
221. Id. § 17 Nr. 4.
222. Sec. 36 Atomgesetz.
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those of the international community. In many ways, efforts
toward this end have been even greater than in France.
V. Nuclear Decommissioning
The imminent closure of Central and Eastern European
nuclear facilities suggests that there is a greater need for an
international framework in decommissioning than for any other
aspect of nuclear energy production. Unfortunately, few legislative
measures have dealt with this issue and an international framework
relating to decommissioning has yet to be conceived.223 Decom-
missioning involves actions taken at the end of a nuclear facility's
operational life which enable the facility to be safely retired from
224service. While both France and Germany have engaged in
sophisticated activities to achieve this end, a sharp contrast
separates each country's approach.
A. France
The large scale and relative homogeneity of France's nuclear
program has given the country a broad basis for developing a
national decommissioning doctrine.225 Under this doctrine, the
facility operator makes an early decision whether to dismantle the
facility immediately or perform the dismantling in successive stages
over a longer period.226 The remainder of the decommissioning
process stems from this initial decision, and is based on a national
waste management policy under the supervision of the National
Agency for Radioactive Waste Management (ANDRA) 7 a
223. Horbach & Hanenburg, supra note 6, at 32.
224. Id. at 30. It has been observed that the definition of decommissioning
varies enormously between countries and international agencies and that the lack
of a uniform definition has contributed to the lack of an international framework
in this field. Id.
225. Andrd Cregut, Decommissioning and Dismantling of Nuclear Facilities, in
5 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE FOR THE PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL CO-
OPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY TECHNICAL REPORTS
95, 97 (1987).
226. Id. The operator generally makes this decision based on the size of the
plant and the advantages, due to radioactive decay, which the operator will gain
by waiting. Thus, it is generally to the operator's advantage to dismantle smaller
plants immediately and avoid the costs of a long term decommissioning process.
In contrast, the decommissioning process for a larger plant normally occurs over
the course of several decades. Id.
227. Id.
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separate regulatory body within the Ministry of Industry.22
Responsibility for the decommissioning activities is then vested in
the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), which sets forth individual
decommissioning plans and then enters contracts for the work's
completion.229
In spite of France's extensive background giving rise to this
uniform doctrine, it has been suggested that this vast experience
remains insufficient for developing a proper regulatory basis for the
regime's decommissioning framework.23° Even so, the fact that
a national decommissioning doctrine has taken form suggests that
at least some of the doctrine's aspects could contribute to the
development of an international model.
B. Germany
In Germany, the current nuclear regime developed without
employing a formal notion of decommissioning.231  Instead,
objectives that would otherwise be achieved through a decommis-
sioning routine are carried out through independent and non-
consecutive processes, each descriptive of an interval between
events leading to the facility's ultimate dismantling.232 Under the
Atomgesetz, all of these processes require that the operator of the
installation acquire a license prior to engaging in the activity.233
There are no other nationally prescribed frameworks for decommis-
sioning activities, and as a result, the actual process may vary
greatly among the various Linder.234 Given the current lack of
a uniform process in its decommissioning routines, the German
regime, as it stands, has much less to offer in the development of
an international model.
228. Decree on the Organization of the Central Administration of the Ministry
for Industry, supra note 158, at 81.
229. Cregut, supra note 225, at 96.
230. Id.
231. Horbach & Hanenburg, supra note 6, at 30.
232. Id. These processes include Stillegung, referring to the period between
operation and the destruction of the plant or safe enclosure, Sichere Einschlufl,
referring to the period following the definitive end of operation in which a
facility's radioactive contents are sealed off, and Beseitigung, in which all of the
facility's components are removed from the installation site. Id.
233. Sec. 7 Nr. 3. Atomgesetz.
234. Horbach and Hanenburg, supra note 6, at 41.
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VI. Prospects for Developing an International Framework
As it has in the past, future efforts aimed at developing
international nuclear frameworks will need to begin through
cooperative measures among nuclear countries. The frameworks
themselves will be based on experiences and existing frameworks
from individual States. It follows that if international harmoniz-
ation is to be successful, efforts to this end must be able to draw on
earlier successes. Therefore, international cooperation must include
exchanging information with respect to regulatory materials, safety
measures, and operating experiences as they relate to as many
facilities as possible.235 It must also include a willingness by
States with existing nuclear regimes to implement an international
framework into their own. As examined above, France and
Germany have already taken a number of legislative measures by
further integrating their regimes along international frameworks.
However, this process of integration is by any measure far from
complete. Both France and Germany have established a number
of preconditions to further integration in certain areas. In other
areas, further measures are needed if the regimes are to have any
bearing in the development of an international framework.
A. Harmonization in Construction and Licensing
The fundamental differences between the French and German
nuclear regimes have in many respects placed the two systems at
odds.. While this would appear to suggest that at least one of the
two countries would first need to enact drastic measures prior to
further integration, this does not seem to be the case. In fact, while
further integration in the area of licensing and construction is
needed, it may already be forthcoming.
As it stands, centralized environmental policies, such as those
surrounding nuclear energy, cannot be freely exercised in Germany
since it is the Linder which must implement such laws.23 6 Even
with this limitation, increased internationalization of nuclear energy
has required the Bund to take a more direct role in enacting
nuclear policies. Under the Atomgesetz, the Bund may now
directly implement regulatory actions from the Euratom Steering
Committee pursuant to the provisions of the Paris Convention,237
235. L6vy, supra note 33, at 25.
236. See generally Rose-Ackerman, supra note 144, at 66-7.
237. Sec. 12a Atomgesetz.
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suggesting that subsequent international enactments will be
imposed directly from Berlin.
Other German legislative developments will also require future
licensing and construction activities to conform to international
technological developments. As examined earlier, the Atomgesetz,
as amended in 1994, now requires that all new reactors conform to
a design standard in which the worst conceivable accident would
not allow for the release of ionizing radiation nor require large
scale evacuations of surrounding areas.238 This measure will
require the implementation of a new generation of nuclear
facilities, namely those of the European Pressurized Reactor (EPR)
design, which are currently under development through a joint
Franco-German effort.239 The EPR is, by its nature, to be devel-
oped as a "European industry" aimed at incorporating the latest
requirements of various EU safety authorities.24 ° One other
design, the Fast Neutron Reactor (FNR), is similarly aimed at
meeting the more recent design requirements.24 While further
away from implementation, this design is being developed by the
combined efforts of the EU and other nuclear countries, such as
the United States, Japan, and Russia.242 It follows that in keeping
with recent legislative provisions, international technological
developments will be intrinsic to German licensing and construction
activities throughout the foreseeable future.
In both Germany and France, aspects of construction and
licensing which lie outside of these new technologies will not escape
international influence. In undertaking its own Research and
Development Framework Program, the European Atomic Energy
Community (Euratom) has emphasized the need for a community-
wide consolidation of existing nuclear programs, asserting the
necessity for community control over all aspects of the nuclear
process within the European Union.243 The EU itself has recently
adopted this position, submitting a resolution for convergence of
the EU's energy policies, and in particular, recognizing the need for
common safety standards throughout the union.2"
238. Id. § 7 Nr. 2a.
239. Report of the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 2.
240. Commission Document on the Nuclear Industries in the European Union,
supra note 1.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Resolution of the European Parliament on the European Union Energy
Policy (1995), 57 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 84 (1996).
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Enactment of such a convergence policy has automatic
ramifications for existing regimes within the EU. For example, as
noted earlier, in Germany, nuclear-related legislative practices
ultimately conform to recommendations of international regulatory
bodies. 245 However, as binding measures, EU-issued standards
have a farther reaching effect than the regulatory body recom-
mendations and could conceivably remove their legal effect.
246
Since these recommendations are non-binding to begin with, this
effective removal, where it occurs, is technically without legal
consequence to the overall regime.247 Even so, this removal
reflects the ease in which such measures supplant those of other
competent authorities. For this reason, future standards, whether
issued by regulatory bodies or by the EU directly, should account
for those of other competent authorities. Respect for such pre-
existing standards would enhance nuclear harmonization among
countries separated by geography or political affiliations, enabling
those standards to embody a growing international framework.
A licensing and construction framework is also developing
through international agreement. The Convention on Nuclear
Safety contains provisions relating to siting,248 design and con-
struction,249  license holder responsibility,25 °  and safety,251
which are for the first time binding under international law. 252
The convention itself represents efforts by international authorities
to further nuclear harmonization, and by design, creates an
international legal framework incorporating various aspects of
government supervision and nuclear standards. 3  Both France
and Germany were among the initial signatories of the convention,
which entered into force on July 26, 1996.254 Since then, over
twenty-two countries, including France, have approved the
convention.2 5  German ratification, however, has yet to oc-
245. Franzen, supra note 120, at 43-4.
246. Id.
247. See generally id. at 43.
248. Convention on Nuclear Safety, supra note 171, art. 17.
249. Id. at art. 18.
250. Id. at art. 9.
251. Id. at arts. 6, 10-11, 14.
252. Report of the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 2.
253. Id.
254. Entry into Force of the Convention of Nuclear Safety, supra note 172, at
136.
255. Id. These include a number of Central and Eastern European Countries,
including Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Czech
Republic, and Slovakia. Id.
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cur.25 6 While the framework set forth by the convention repre-
sents only an initial step in formulating a comprehensive and
international model, ratification clearly indicates a country's
commitment to bringing its nuclear licensing and construction
activities in line with a greater international regime. To this end,
Germany should also undertake to ratify the convention.
While such ratification would itself only bring Germany in line
with provisions to which many Central and Eastern European
States have already committed themselves, focus should be on the
greater implications. Such ratification would provide an additional
basis for greater French and German nuclear integration, enabling
Germany to incorporate the treaty's provisions into its own
statutory framework. As a result, this additional, shared statutory
framework would supplement the countries' Euratom Treaty
obligations as a harmonizing force, bridging the gap toward the
development of a viable model regime.
However, as a signatory to the convention, Germany is clearly
in position to undertake ratification in the near future. As in other
areas related to licensing and construction activities, greater French
and German harmonization is clearly forthcoming. In the mean-
time, as existing integrating forces develop, both countries need
only continue along their present courses.
B. Harmonization in the Operation of Nuclear Facilities
As examined earlier, various aspects of nuclear operation in
both the French and German regimes have already come into line
with emerging international frameworks. In this respect, much of
the harmonization process has already taken place. Fundamental
differences, where they exist, can be attributed to differences in the
legal systems of each country.257  Differing legal systems also
relate to differences in the material contents of safety stan-
dards. 5' However, these differences do not necessarily reflect a
lack of harmonization in activities related to nuclear monitoring
and liability.
As members of the European Union, both France and
Germany are already subject to an EU regulatory framework
aimed at ensuring uniform operator monitoring. The EU Council
256. Id.
257. See Schwarzer, supra note 9, at 10.
258. Id.
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Directive of July 15, 1980,259 as amended by the Directive of
September 3, 1984,26 sets forth specific, binding safety standards
relating to allowable levels of ionizing radiation on workers and
members of the general public. More recently, the EU has
required member States to ensure that each nuclear operator
explicitly define its accident prevention policy.26 1  Under this
requirement, all operators must also include details of the opera-
tor's plan for handling major accidents. 262  These enactments
reflect the EU's intention to subject all of its internal nuclear
regimes to a single uniform framework for nuclear monitoring.
This further suggests that such an internal framework will continue
to develop.
Even amidst this additional binding framework, existing French
and German operating standards demonstrate certain levels of
correspondence. In both countries, operating standards originated
from early industrial considerations of theoretical safety needs.
263
These were originally created on a case-by-case basis and evolved
into set requirements only after sufficient operating experience
could justify the implementation of the requirements. 26  As a
result, operating standards came to reflect the specific needs of
each regime. However, while the resulting frameworks have also
come to reflect the administrative structures of each country, the
overall differences have not been great.265 It has been observed
that ultimately, it is the nuclear industry, and not the administrative
process, that develops operating standards related to nuclear safety,
and that the best nuclear standards are those that are a product of
both government and industry.26 In this context, it has also been
observed that due to the varying requirements of individual nuclear
regimes, the most specific requirements related to nuclear operation
in one regime should not be imposed on another.267
Since operating standards have developed so that they reflect
the individual characteristics of a particular regime, those character-
istics should be preserved to the extent that they reflect those
needs. Current efforts aimed at harmonizing nuclear operations,
259. Council Directive 80/836, 1980, O.J. (L-246) 1 (Euratom).
260. Council Directive 80/467, 1984, O.J. (L-265) 4 (Euratom).
261. The Seveso Directive 11 (1996), 59 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 64, 65 (1997).
262. Id.
263. Schwarzer, supra note 9, at 3.
264. Id.
265. Franzen, supra note 120, at 57.
266. Schwarzer, supra note 9, at 7.
267. Franzen, supra note 120, at 57.
724 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:3
such as those. represented in the provisions of the Nuclear Safety
Convention and the aforementioned legislative measures of the EU,
prescribe binding measures which may not always reflect such
needs. For example, Germany has expressed its concern that the
Nuclear Safety Convention may require some of its existing nuclear
facilities to cease operations under certain conditions. 268  This
may partly explain the country's reluctance to ratify the convention,
and presents an additional issue to other nuclear countries that are
considering ratification. At minimum, provisions should be
provided in future international legislation allowing for regimes to
operate under their existing standards. The most recent standards
should apply only to facilities that have not yet come into opera-
tion. United Nations Technical Reports have suggested that even
where operating standards conflict, similar safety levels may exist
even though the strict details differ.269 Thus, such allowances
could enable existing facilities to operate without necessarily
compromising levels of safety. Providing for such allowances would
also lead to a more viable model for harmonization. Central and
Eastern European Countries operating Soviet-designed facilities
would still be able to apply the model, which would remain in place
as those countries gradually switched to nuclear facilities of
Western design.
Forces have also been set in motion to further harmonize third
party liability regimes. While France and Germany's primary
motivations toward this end have been their participation in the
Paris Convention, the scope of their participation has been
extended. The 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage,270 which is virtually identical to the Paris
Convention in its basic features, governs third party liability among
its fourteen signatory States.2 71 Unlike the Paris Convention, the
Vienna Convention has an unlimited regional scope, and its
signatories include countries around the world.272 Under a 1988
Joint Protocol, the provisions of the Paris and Vienna Conventions
were combined,27 3 creating an all-encompassing liability frame-
268. Report of the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 2.
269. Schwarzer, supra note 9, at 12.
270. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, (visited Nov.
11,1997) <http://www.varam.gov.lv/English/Radiation/Legal/Liability.htm> [herein-
after Vienna Convention].
271. See Elbaradei, supra note 12.
272. Id.
273. Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and
the Paris Convention, (visited Nov. 11, 1997) <http://www.nea.fr/html/law/-
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work governed under the provisions of the combined treaties and
involving all signatories to the individual conventions. 274  This
additional measure is highly indicative of the existing harmoniz-
ation trend in the field of third party liability. As examined earlier,
the incorporation of Paris Convention provisions into the French
and German statutory frameworks is clearly deepening the level of
integration in this field. With the addition of the Joint Protocol,
the evolving international framework is clearly widening as well.
As with licensing and construction, an international framework
relating to the operational aspects of nuclear energy is clearly
taking form, and both France and Germany can expect further
harmonization to occur if they continue to proceed in their current
tracks. It remains, however, a matter for the international
authorities to design future legislative measures ,so that existing
national frameworks may initially comply without adverse effects
to the operation of existing facilities. Such precautions will be
necessary if the resulting international framework is to provide a
viable model for other regimes to follow.
C. Harmonization in Decommissioning
In forming prospects for harmonization, the field of decommis-
sioning poses an added challenge since few legislative measures
deal with it explicitly.275 Those that do often do so only by
analogy. For example, one international body, the steering
committee of the Nuclear Energy Administration (NEA), main-
tained that even in cases where a nuclear installation has ceased
operation, the provisions of the Paris Convention continue to
apply.276 The NEA issued this opinion in spite of the conven-
tion's lack of any explicit reference to the decommissioning
process. 277 Similar analogies have been made with regard to the
Vienna Convention.278
One international agreement which has explicitly dealt with
decommissioning is the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Under the
convention, a facility loses its status as a nuclear installation upon
removal of its nuclear fuel elements and upon the applicant's
nljoint prot.html> [hereinafter Joint Protocol].
274. See generally Elbaradei, supra note 12.
275. Horbach & Hanenburg, supra note 6, at 35.
276. Id. at 39.
277. Id.
278. See generally id.
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initiation of a program for decommissioning.279 While the scope
of the treaty's application is limited after the initiation of such a
28program, 8° the treaty still mandates that a decommissioning
program will commence upon a finding that an existing installation
is unsafe and cannot be made safe through practical measures.2 81
In spite of the treaty's limited scope with respect to decommission-
ing, the fact that the treaty addresses the issue opens the door to
further international agreement.
For this reason, States that are parties to the Paris and Vienna
Conventions should undertake to extend the agreements' provisions
to include activities related to decommissioning. Doing so would
clearly establish an internationally recognized decommissioning
framework and pick up where the Convention on Nuclear Safety
left off. The addition of such provisions to the existing Paris
/Vienna Convention framework would be a relatively moderate
amendment, as it would merely codify existing interpretations of
the conventions' language.2  With decommissioning requiring
fewer resources than other aspects of the nuclear process, the
enactment of such provisions would also require a smaller commit-
ment from each signatory party.283 Further, such an amendment
could easily be achieved through a minor, supplementary agree-
ment, similar to the Brussels Convention or Joint Protocol.
Both France and Germany appear to be in a position to
embrace such an agreement. It has been suggested that in France,
the national decommissioning doctrine, developed as it is, lacks a
future regulatory basis.2 4  Adding explicit decommissioning
provisions to the Paris Convention would prompt France to codify
those amendments into its own statutory framework, just as it did
with the Paris Convention's existing provisions. Germany, though
lacking a developed decommissioning doctrine, has clearly poised
itself for developing a decommissioning framework of its own. The
German Government has specifically included decommissioning as
an objective in improving nuclear safety in Eastern Europe. 285 At
the same time, the Bund has reiterated its belief that internally, the
further development of nuclear energy is necessary due to the
279. Convention on Nuclear Safety, supra note 171, art. 2(i).
280. Horbach & Hanenburg, supra note 6, at 37.
281. Convention on Nuclear Safety, supra note 171, art. 6.
282. See generally Horbach & Hanenburg, supra note 6, at 39.
283. See generally id at 32.
284. Cregut, supra note 225, at 96.
285. Report of the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 2.
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technology's increasing international importance.286 Subsequently,
the German regime has also undertaken a number of efforts toward
internal nuclear standardization. 87 It would seem that incorpo-
rating a decommissioning framework into Germany's existing
statutory regime would be a logical step in achieving these
objectives.
Another advantage to supplementary convention provisions
would be their means of implementation. As is the case in nuclear
operation, a successful decommissioning framework must account
for the inherent differences between regimes so that each regime
may apply the new provisions without adversely affecting its
existing nuclear installations. This is particularly important where
a sharp contrast exists among regimes, such as in the case of France
and Germany. Additional convention provisions, unlike a
unilaterally-imposed act, would leave actual implementation to each
country. Further, such provisions would allow for a broader scope
of application. The new requirements could extend to all countries
party to the Paris or Vienna conventions, rather than being
restricted to a particular geographic area, such as within the
European Union.
Additional provisions to the Paris Convention would enable
both France and Germany to adhere to an international decommis-
sioning framework in a manner reflective of their individual needs.
In spite of their fundamental differences, each country would be
free to incorporate the new provisions into its existing legal
framework without upsetting the current operational arrangement
of its nuclear regime. France and Germany would thus set an
example under which Central and Eastern European countries
could easily follow suit.
VII. Conclusion
The development of an international legal framework relating
to nuclear energy is imminent. In France and Germany, the
domestic nuclear regimes represent two opposing extremes of
centralized and decentralized organization. In spite of this
fundamental difference, efforts to foster international nuclear
harmonization have successfully incorporated common legislative
elements into the two contrasting regimes. As a result, the
286. Id.
287. Birkhofer, supra note 60, at 2.
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foundation has been set for developing a viable international
model.
In the fields of nuclear licensing and construction, internation-
ally-binding legislation and recent technical developments have
forced both France and Germany to conform to international
nuclear standards. An opportunity for greater conformity has also
emerged through international agreement. While Germany, in
particular, has been reluctant to adopt this latter measure, it is
likely that country will in fact choose to conform in the near future.
To move toward greater harmonization in this area, France and
Germany need only follow their current paths. The concern rests
with international bodies, which must ensure that existing standards
receive due respect.
In nuclear operations, harmonization has also occurred through
international legislation and agreements. These measures have
complemented each country's existing operational framework,
setting those frameworks onto a path of convergence. Future
measures related to harmonizing nuclear operations need only
account for the individualized needs of each regime.
The successful development of an international model requires
that action be taken in the field of nuclear decommissioning. While
this aspect of an international framework is the most urgently
needed, it is also by far the least developed. Both France and
Germany remain poised to incorporate decommissioning provisions
into their current statutory framework. A modest addition to the
framework provided by the Paris and Vienna Conventions would
enable both countries to incorporate these provisions.
Given the impending development of an international legal
framework for the production of nuclear energy, it is imperative
that the process of nuclear decommissioning be included. This
inclusion depends upon the combined initiatives of individual
nuclear regimes. If successful efforts toward including the decom-
missioning process transpire, the successful harmonization of the
regimes in France and Germany could very well serve as the model
for this development.
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